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Policy accommodation versus electoral turnover: 
Policy representation in Britain, 1945-2015 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Does public policy in the UK respond to changes in public preferences? If so, is this the result of the 
government changing its policy to reflect preferences (Ôpolicy accommodationÕ) or the result of 
governments that pursue unpopular policies being replaced at elections by governments more in line 
with the public (Ôelectoral turnoverÕ)? We explore these questions by estimating aggregate public 
preferences (Ôthe policy moodÕ) using responses to 287 questions administered 2087 times and policy 
using budgetary data (Ônon-military government expenditureÕ) for the whole of the post-war period. 
We find that mood moves in the opposite direction to policy and variations in mood are associated 
with variations in vote intentions. Policy is responsive to party control but not directly responsive to 
mood. Shifts in mood eventually lead to a change in government and thus policy, but this process 
may be very slow if the public has doubts about the competence of the opposition.  
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1.! RESPONSIVENESS AND POLICY REPRESENTATION 
In this paper we examine whether policy in Britain is shaped by public preferences.
1
 We examine 
two accounts by which policy responsiveness could be achieved. ÔPolicy accommodationÕ suggests 
that office-seeking governments respond directly to changes in preferences by changing policy. 
ÔElectoral turnoverÕ, on the other hand, suggests that policy responds indirectly. Parties pursue 
policies consistent with their ideology. The publicÕs preferences respond to policy thermostaticallyÕ, 
moving right as policy moves left and left as it moves right (Wlezien 1995). These movements 
produce changes in vote intentions and, ultimately, a turnover of power from one ÔsideÕ to the other. 
This process, however, may only operate after a considerable time lag if the public initially lacks 
faith in the competence of the opposition. 
There are two sets of reasons why we should be concerned with whether policy is responsive 
to public opinion. Firstly, from a strictly positive point of view we want to know to what degree 
government policy is constrained by public opinion. To what degree are policy makers forced to 
react to changes in public opinion and to what degree are they able to act independently of it? 
Secondly, from a normative point of view we are interested in how ÒwellÓ democracy is functioning 
Ð do governments act in a way that is representative of the public? Of course, there are many 
different conceptions of democracy, some of which do not require the congruence of public opinion 
and policy in a substantive sense.
2
 Nevertheless, the basic meaning of democracy is that the Òpeople 
ruleÕ, and this is often interpreted to mean that the people should have control of the broad direction 
of policy (May 1978; Rehfeld 2009, Petitt 2010). As Andrew Rehfeld puts it, Ò...the presumption of 
democracy is that there be a close correspondence between the laws of a nation and the preferences 
of citizens who are ruled by themÓ (Rehfeld 2009, p. 214). 
However, when we consider representative democracy, it is not immediately obvious how 
responsive policy should be to public opinion, especially if we embrace a trustee conception of 
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representation. If we think that the appropriate form of representation is a delegate model Ð the 
government ought to follow the instructions of the people Ð and we apply this to the government as a 
whole as opposed to individual representatives, then we should expect government policy to follow 
public opinion.
3
 Of course, it is still necessary to interpret what the peopleÕs ÒinstructionsÓ are.
4
 Even 
in this case we might expect the government to follow the will of the people in broad terms rather 
than in terms of specific policies. Following Christiano (1996, p.215-7), we might expect the 
government to be a delegate in terms of ends, while being a trustee in terms of means. 
However, if we endorse a trustee model of representation Ð representatives are expected to 
use their judgment to advance the interests of the people to the best of their ability Ð then a 
considerable amount of slippage between public opinion and policy may be completely acceptable in 
a democracy. It is still possible that trusteeship will produce a high degree of responsiveness. If the 
people choose trustees whose values and interests align closely with their own, they may choose 
policies that naturally track the preferences of the public (what Mansbridge 2003 terms Ògyroscopic 
representationÓ). Similarly, trustee representation and popular control could be reconciled through 
deliberation and public reason, in what Pettit calls Òinterpretive representationÓ.
5
 On the other hand, 
while trustees are expected to act in the interest of the public, they also may choose policies that 
differ from what the public wants. If the policies demanded by the public want are impossible or ill-
advised (they do not achieve the ends the public wishes to achieve) then trustee representation will 
result in policies that diverge from what the public wants.
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However, it is important not to take this argument too far. While trustee representation allows 
for some slippage between public opinion and policy, we should still be concerned if there is a 
complete disconnect. If democratic trusteeship allows the public to be completely disregarded, then 
there is a danger that it simply becomes a euphemism for benign despotism or paternalism. A trustee, 
according to Burke (1777/1963), must make decisions in the interests of the people, and may not 
substitute their own interests in place of those of the people. When we observe government policy 
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diverging from public opinion, we are faced with the question as to whether this is the legitimate use 
of trusteeship in the interests of the people, or whether the government is substituting its own 
interests for those of the people. Lack of policy responsiveness certainly does not prove that there 
has been a failure of democratic representation, but it does call for explanation and justification. As 
Rehfeld (2009, p. 214) argues, Òwe must always justify and explain cases in which law deviates from 
citizen preferences, whereas no such prima facie justification is required in cases when law conforms 
to the preferences and wills of those it governs.Ó 
Thus, while responsiveness does not give us a simple measure of democratic representation, 
it can still provide a valuable test of it. We would argue that the responsiveness of aggregate public 
spending to public opinion is actually a more appropriate test than the responsiveness of particular 
policies or the budget allocations to particular departments. This is because it is a very general 
measure of policy that reflects broad visions of society, rather than specific policy expertise. If 
detailed public policies do not reflect public opinion, a government can always claim that it is acting 
as a trustee, using its superior technical knowledge to make informed decisions. It may even claim 
that what the public wants is impossible. However, it is clearly possible to have different levels of 
aggregate spending and taxes, as this varies greatly amongst countries.
7
 Furthermore, there does not 
exist a technocratic consensus about what the appropriate size of government is; rather this appears 
to be a matter of values and the type of society people prefer. If the government persistently ignores 
public opinion in such a general sense, we may well worry that it has exceeded its role as trustee and 
substituted its own values for those of the people. 
In addition to the policy responsiveness we study, other forms of responsiveness may also be 
valuable in testing how representative government is. One example is attention responsiveness 
(Jennings and John 2009, John et. al. 2013, Bevan and Jennings 2014, Bertelli and John 2013a, 
2013b). This considers the degree to which the policy priorities of governments (typically measured 
by the weight given to various policy areas in the QueenÕs speech) corresponds to the policy 
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priorities of the public (usually measured by the answer to the question of what is the most important 
problem facing the country). While both policy responsiveness and attention responsiveness both 
deal with the allocation of a scare resource (money or time), they seem to behave quite differently 
(see Bevan and Jennings 2014, Jennings and Wlezien 2015).
8
 Nevertheless, if a government is 
representative of the people, we would expect it to pay attention to the issues that the people think 
are important, even if it does not necessarily allocate more money to these areas. If a government 
consistently ignores the issues the people think are important, we are surely entitled to ask whether 
the government is really representing the interests of the people. 
While responsiveness may not provide us with a direct measure of democratic representation, it 
does provide a valuable of test of it. If we do not observe responsiveness (whether in policy or 
attention), this may serve as a warning flag that demands explanation. This caveat aide, we examine 
the relationship between preferences and policy in Britain from 1945 to 2015 using macro-level 
indicators and appropriate time series methods. In section 2 we introduce the left-right framework to 
summarise preferences and policy. In sections 3 and 4 we conceptualise both these as time series 
(Ôthe policy moodÕ and Ônon-military government spendingÕ) that respond to each other. In section 5 
we describe our time series models. In sections 6 and 7 we examine two steps in the Ôelectoral 
turnoverÕ mechanism (whether mood responds to policy and vote to mood). In section 8 we examine 
both the final stage in the electoral turnover mechanism (whether policy responds to party) and the 
policy accommodation mechanism (whether policy responds to mood). In section 9 we compare our 
findings with previous studies and in section 10 we draw conclusions about the impact of party 
ideology. 
2.! THE LEFT-RIGHT FRAMEWORK 
Disagreements about goals are central to most accounts of representative democracy because they 
motivate parties and electorate alike (Downs 1957). Parties pursue ideological goals subject to 
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electoral considerations (Str¿m 1990). The electorate want governments both to produce policy that 
honours their values and govern with competence (Erikson et al. 2002). Preferences and positions 
link parties with the electorate and provide the basis for effective communication (Scarbrough 1984). 
There are a very large number of issues that people disagree about. If we are to understand the 
interaction between parties and the electorate we need to cut away inessential detail (Budge 2006). 
Accordingly, we assume that the interaction between parties and the electorate takes place along 
single left-right dimension (Downs 1957). The preferences that are of interest to us are those on 
which the parties have taken positions. ÔLeftÕ means those preferences expressed or positions 
adopted by Labour. ÔRightÕ means those adopted by the Conservatives (Budge and Farlie 1977).  
Parties aim to attract voters. They take positions on wide range of issues. Some are enduring. 
Some are transient. The ÔcoreÕ issues that divide the major parties relate to economics. Labour has 
generally supported ÔmoreÕ government activity, ÔmoreÕ collective action and ÔmoreÕ equality. The 
Conservatives have generally supported ÔlessÕ (Blais et al. 1993). Nevertheless, Labour and the 
Conservatives disagree on other issues relating to law and order, individual freedom, the 
environment and international affairs. As new issues emerged, the parties have adopted opposing 
positions and these have acquired ÔleftÕ or ÔrightÕ polarities (Carmines and Stimson 1989). It is usual, 
for example, to label support for shorter sentences, equal rights for gays, environment protection and 
international co-operation as Ôleft-wingÕ. This enables analysts to use texts to summarise party 
positions using both economic and non-economic positions. The MARPOR ÔRILEÕ scores, for 
example, provide evidence about how parties compete for office (Budge et al. 2001).  
There are doubts whether public preferences can be so simplified (Budge 2006). Fortunately, it 
is not necessary to resolve the vexing issue of the ÔrealÕ structure of public preferences here (Stimson 
2004). Our purpose is simply to summarise preferences in such a way as to understand the 
interaction between parties and the electorate. Accordingly, we focus on the core economic issues 
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that represent the enduring differences between the parties relating to government intervention, 
collective action and economic equality (Heath et al. 1994). This decision also simplifies the 
measurement of policy since it is difficult Ð if not impossible Ð to produce annual measures of policy 
that incorporate both economic and non-economic issues using textual data.
9
 
3. MEASURING MACRO-LEVEL PREFERENCES: ANNUAL POLICY MOOD 
If we are to analyse responsiveness we need a public preference time series (Erikson et al. 2002). 
Micro-level theories provide us with good reasons for believing that we can use preferences across a 
wide range of issues to produce an annual indicator of public preferences. Many issues become 
Ôseemingly relatedÕ and acquire Ôleft-rightÕ polarities (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Since most 
people have low levels of political awareness they absorb both ÔleftÕ and ÔrightÕ considerations 
(Zaller and Feldman 1992). The typical individual is ÔambivalentÕ about issues. Their responses to 
questions depend on their predispositions, the issues raised, precise wording and response options 
offered. Individual predispositions can be viewed as a running tally of ÔleftÕ and ÔrightÕ 
considerations across all issues. If we could aggregate preferences across both individuals and issues, 
this Ôdouble summationÕ would provide an indicator of the electorateÕs aggregate (varying) left-right 
preferences or Ôpolicy moodÕ (Stimson 1999). 
We cannot directly average aggregate responses across survey items. Each survey question 
has its own biases as a result of the issues that it engages, precise wording and response options 
provided (Zaller and Feldman 1992). Each question has its own metric. Nevertheless, we can use a 
method Ð the dyads ratio algorithm Ð to find a common metric and then aggregate across issues 
(Stimson 1999). Before we outline this method, however, we describe the data at our disposal. 
3.1 Data: the preferences database 
Responses to a wide range of survey probes reflect left-right preferences. Variations in responses 
over time should, therefore, reflect the changing Ôpolicy moodÕ (Stimson, 1999). The raw data to 
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estimate mood are aggregate responses to controversial questions. They require people to ÔchooseÕ 
between options, express ÔpreferencesÕ, adopt ÔpositionsÕ or take ÔsidesÕ (Ellis and Stimson 2012). 
Since mood is inferred by observing changes between two time points, identical questions 
must be asked in at least two separate years to form ÔdyadsÕ (Stimson, 1999). Items that refer to 
particular parties or politicians are excluded from the database, since it is difficult to disentangle 
attitudes to these objects from preferences.
10
 All the data are taken from nationally representative 
surveys. In total, the database contains 791 items and 5363 separate readings of preferences.
11
  
3.2 Content 
Our database consists of responses to many controversial issues on which the parties can be expected 
to take contrasting positons. Some 287 questions in 2087 separate readings of preferences (39.7 per 
cent of the total) relate to Ôcore-economicÕ domain, including government intervention, trade unions, 
public ownership, public spending, taxation, inequality and the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment (see table 1). Another 1102 readings (21 per cent of the total readings) relate to 
ÔsocialÕ issues. This domain includes crime and law and order, moral and social attitudes, individual 
rights, the family and abortion. The ÔotherÕ category (around 40 per cent of all readings) relate to 
diverse issues including immigration, international affairs, defence spending, nuclear weapons, 
Northern Ireland, Europe, national sentiment, the monarchy and left-right self-placement.  
<Table 1. Topic coverage > 
If we were confident that public preferences Ð like party positions Ð were undimensional, we 
could estimate mood using all the available data. Since we are ignorant of the real structure, we 
estimate mood using only items relating to the Ôcore economicÕ issues. Even after this self-imposed 
restriction, however, there here is more than sufficient data to reliably estimate annual mood.  
3.3 Coding responses 
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Our focus here is on the ÔcoreÕ left-right issues. Responses are scored from high (most left or Labour) 
and to low (most right or Conservative) responses. It is straightforward to code these items since the 
parties have taken consistent (opposing) positions.
12
 Assigning the ÔwrongÕ polarities to responses 
makes no difference to the estimates of mood Ð it simply results in negative factor loadings that alert 
us to a coding error (Stimson 1999).  
All preferences are expressed as an index of preferences: 
!"#$%	'(	)*$($*$"+$, = 	
./01	23/0/3/45/6789:
./01;<=>?1	23/0/3/45/6789:
	×100  
 These indexes reflect then balance of left-right preferences on controversial issues. They are 
fed into the dyads ratio algorithm in order to estimate mood. 
3.4 Method: the dyads ratio algorithm 
The raw index of preferences represents the percentage of all substantive responses that are ÔleftÕ.
13
 
Each index is then expressed as a ratio at two time points (years).  
Rij=
xt+i
xt+j
 
These dyads have an expected value of 1.0 and can be averaged to produce a rough estimate of 
underlying preferences (C1). The algorithm calculates all the possible dyads for each series %1D 
iteratively and averages them:
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Pt=
xtk
N
k=1
N
 
Since not all items are equally valid indicators of underlying preferences each series is 
weighted by their estimated validity ℎFG. 
Pt=
hi
2
xtk
N
k=1
h
2
N
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Using ratios causes the original metric to be lost. This is reintroduced by a standardization of 
the latent scale in terms of the validity-weighted means and standard deviations of the input items 
(Stimson 1999). The individual items are scored as per cent left over per cent left plus percent right. 
The estimated mood, therefore, has the same interpretation. Fifty is the neutral point. Values above 
50 indicate net left preferences and those below 50 indicate net right preferences. 
3.5 Estimates of the policy mood 
Figure 1 displays the estimated mood from 1945 to 2015. About 46 per cent of all variance in 
observed preferences is common to this mood. The remaining variance Ð some 54 per cent Ð is either 
specific to the particular issue domain or is item-specific; i.e., a function of the specific wording and 
measurement error for each question (Erikson et al. 2002, p. 203). 
Averaging over many items reduces the noise induced by sampling errors (Stimson 1999).
15
 In 
the early period from 1945 to 1964, when data is in shorter supply, the series zig-zags (shown by the 
broken line in Figure 1). In the later period, after 1964, the series is smoother (shown by the 
unbroken line). Nevertheless, the overall pattern is clear. The series starts off high (left) in 1950s and 
then generally drifts down (right) until 1979.
16
 From 1979 onwards the series tracks back up and to 
the left, peaking in the early 1990s. This pattern matches standard accounts of public opinion 
(Kavanagh 1988). From 1997 the series drifts down (right) under New Labour. It reaches its lowest 
point in 2010, when the Conservatives return to power in a coalition government. It then reverses 
itself under the coalition government between 2010 and 2015. Indeed, by 2015, the mood was as far 
left as it had been in 2004, the year before Labour won a third election victory.  
< Figure 1. The Policy Mood 1945-2015> 
Broadly speaking, these movements seem to be related to be related to the electoral 
performance of the parties. This suggests that the mood series has a degree of face-validity. In 
particular, three Ôturning pointÕ elections were presaged by movements in mood. The Conservative 
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victory in 1979, New LabourÕs landslide in 1997 and the Tories return to power Ð as the dominant 
party in the coalition in 2010 Ð all appear to reflect prior movements. Yet some election outcomes do 
not seem to be explicable given movements in mood. The October 1974 and 1979 general elections, 
for example, produced a Labour victory on the one hand and a Conservative victory on the other, 
despite the similar levels of mood. Similarly, the 1992 and 1997 elections produced a Conservative 
victory and a Labour landslide, though mood was at much the same level. Other factors Ð social 
change, party positions and assessments of party competence Ð must be taken into account. 
 In order to illustrate the content of mood, we briefly examine the factor loadings for 
individual items on the estimated mood series. Since there are 287 series, it is not possible to 
examine all the loadings. And, since the series vary in length, it would be misleading examine the 
loadings for all the individual series. Table 2 displays the loadings for the items that are entered in 
the database in at least ten years and load at 0.5 or above.  
< Table 2. Items loading on the policy mood> 
The items that load on mood relate to trade unions, welfare, tax and spending and inequality. 
This is a consequence of our decision to include only the ÔcoreÕ issues. The same items would feature 
prominently in the equivalent table if we had estimates the mood using all the preferences data.
17
 
The mood estimated from this larger database, moreover, correlates highly with our mood measure 
(PearsonÕs R=0.90). These observations do not resolve the issue of the dimensionality of preferences. 
They do reassure us that our decision to use only ÔcoreÕ items is not consequential. Averaging a large 
number of items produces a robust estimator of preferences. 
4. MEASURING ANNUAL MACRO-LEVEL POLICY 
In order to assess the interaction between governments and the electorate, it is necessary to develop a 
measure of government policy analogous to our measure of mood. ÔPolicyÕ is a course of action or 
the principles adopted by government. It is difficult to summarise because governments take lots of 
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action make many statements of principle. They legislate, enter into treaties, make administrative 
decisions, tax and spend and issue statements of intent. It is also difficult to summarise because it can 
be indicated by both words (intentions) and deeds (actions and policy delivery).  
4.1 Non-military government spending 
Spending is a particularly appropriate indicator of delivered policy. It provides a numeraire that gets 
to heart of the choice between ÔmoreÕ or ÔlessÕ (Blais et al. 1996, p. 43). The key indicator of Total 
managed expenditure (TME), for example, summarises government activity in an annual time series. 
This includes Departmental Expenditure Limits (DELs) that have been allocated to Departments and 
Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) that is not controlled by government departments.
18
  
< Figure 2. Non-military government spending, 1948-2013> 
The partiesÕ preferences about spending reflect their ideologies. Labour governments prefer 
ÔmoreÕ spending on welfare, health and transport. Conservative governments prefer ÔlessÕ. In some 
domains, however, these preferences are reversed. The most significant case is defence spending. 
This has fluctuated between a high of 9.8 per cent of GDP in 1953 to a low of 2 per cent in 2015.
19
 In 
general, Conservatives prefer more and Labour prefers less spending on defence. Military spending, 
moreover, is influenced by perceptions of threat and is less responsive to domestic politics. In order 
to provide a more accurate indicator of domestic policy, we subtract defence as a percentage of GDP 
spending from TME to produce Non-Military Government Expenditure (NMGE). 
<Figure 3. Changes in non-military government expenditure by government, 1951-2015> 
Figure 2 displays the NMGE series from 1950 through to 2015.
20
 This provides evidence of 
year on year variation but says little about the impact of party control of government over policy. 
Figure 3 displays changes in NMGE under governments from 1951 to 2015. Dark blocs indicate 
Conservative governments, lighter blocs indicate Labour. This tells a fascinating story. All 
Conservative governments, with the single exception of Heath (1970-4), have reduced NMGE.
21
 All 
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Labour governments have increased it. Our characterisation of elections as a choice between ÔmoreÕ 
with Labour and ÔlessÕ with the Conservatives has a degree of face validity. 
<Figure 4. Average direct tax levels> 
4.2 Average direct taxation 
The electorate are collectively ambivalent about the government policy activity. They prefer ÔmoreÕ 
public services. They also prefer ÔlessÕ bureaucracy and taxation. They also worry about the impact 
of welfare on individual incentives (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Since it is difficult to produce time 
series indicators of bureaucracy and incentives, we focus on taxation.
22
 Specifically, we incorporate a 
measure of the average direct tax (income tax plus national insurance) paid by male workers on 
median incomes (see Figure 4).
23
 This measure does not, of course, cover all taxes but reflects public 
debates in Britain, which have centred on direct taxation.
24
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
When we inspect the graphs for mood, vote intentions and domestic spending, it is clear that these 
variables are not stationary. That is to say, they do not oscillate around a single mean, but instead the 
mean moves over time. Formal stationarity tests confirm this.
25
 Non-stationarity creates problems 
when analysing time series, in particular the problem of spurious regression (Enders 2004). It is quite 
likely that two non-stationary variables will correlate significantly, even if they are completely 
unrelated. We need to ensure that our results are not simply the result of such spurious correlation. 
One approach to the problem of non-stationarity is to take the first difference of the data (or 
further differences if necessary) so we have a stationary time series. This deals with non-stationarity 
but only allows us to draw inferences about the short dynamics of the relationship between the 
variables. An alternative approach is to use the error correction model approach of the type: 
∆Yt = b0 + b1 ∆Xt + a (Yt-1 Ð g0 Ð g1 Xt-1) 
14 
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This also allows us to model the long-term relationships between the variables. It assumes that 
there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between the variables, and that the further out of 
equilibrium we are the larger the adjustment (the parameter a represents the speed of this 
adjustment). However, error correction models are only appropriate with non-stationary data if the 
variables are co-integrated (Engle and Granger 1987). Roughly speaking, this means that the 
variables move up and down in parallel, and the relationship remains approximately the same over 
the whole time period.
26
 If the variables are not co-integrated, we again face the problem of spurious 
regression. 
We use the error correction model whenever there is a suitable co-integrating relationship. We 
test for co-integration in two ways. First, we run an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals of 
the regression of the variables in levels. Second, the error correction parameter is itself a test of co-
integration. However, when using this as a test for co-integration, it is necessary to use the 
distribution derived by MacKinnon (1995) and Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002), instead of the 
normal t-distribution reported by most software packages (see Grant and Lebo 2017). We find strong 
evidence of co-integration in our models with mood and vote intentions as the dependent variable, 
and use error correction models in these cases. However, we do not find sufficient evidence of co-
integration for our model explaining NMGE. In this case we take the first difference of government 
spending, modelling the change in government spending as a function of mood and economic 
conditions. This is similar to the approach in Soroka and Wlezien (2009). 
There has recently been a debate about the appropriateness of error correction models in 
political science. In a special edition of Political Analysis, Grant and Lebo (2016) argue that many 
applications of error correction models are inappropriate because they are applied to data where co-
integration is not present. They suggest that the conditions required to use error correction models 
rarely apply in political science. Others have argued that error correction models are more widely 
applicable (Keele, Lin and Webb 2016; Esarey 2016; Enns et al. 2016).
27
 However, there is 
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agreement that if the data is non-stationary, error correction models are only appropriate where co-
integration is present. We only use error correction models where there is clear evidence of co-
integration, using the tests recommended by Grant and Lebo (2016).
28
 
6! DOES MOOD RESPOND TO POLICY? 
We now examine the electoral turnover mechanism in two stages. In this section we examine 
whether public preferences (as measured by the policy mood) respond to policy. In the next section 
we examine whether vote intentions respond to mood. 
Previous research has established that preferences for policy (Rij) reflect the difference between 
ideal points (Pi) and actual policy (Pj) (Wlezien 1995).  
 Rij = Pi - Pj 
When actual policy exceeds the ideal (Pi>Pj) then Rij>0 and the electorate signal their 
preference for less. When policy is less than ideal (Pi<Pj) then Rij<0 and the electorate signal their 
preferences for ÔmoreÕ activity. Preferences act like a ÔthermostatÕ. The same logic applies to mood. 
As spending increases the public want less. Accordingly: 
H1. The electorate move to the right as NMGE increases 
 The electorate prefer lower levels of direct tax taxation. Accordingly: 
H2. The electorate move to the right as average income tax increases. 
Government activity is not the only influence on mood. Exogenous changes in the economy 
can also shape preferences. Increasing unemployment, for example, will lead the electorate to prefer 
more activity in order to reduce unemployment.
29
 Thus, independently of policy, the electorate will 
shift left as unemployment increases. These considerations suggest: 
H3. The electorate move to the left as unemployment increases. 
16 
!
We model mood using an error correction model. Given that our variables are non-stationary 
and there is a co-integration relation between the dependent and independent variables, this is 
appropriate.
30
 The dependent variable is mood. The independent variables are lagged values of 
average income tax levels, NMGE and unemployment. 
Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients from the error correction model. The estimated 
error correction rate (0.81) implies that over 80 per cent of any deviation of preferences from the 
target rate in either direction is corrected within one year. The coefficients provide support for H1 
and H2. The statistically significant negative coefficients for long-term effects for both NMGE (H =-
0.59) and average income tax rates (H =-0.37) clearly suggest thermostatic relationships. There is 
also short-term relationship between ∆%	and ∆J for NMGE (H =-0.59). As government activity 
increases, the electorate moves right and, as government activity decreases, it moves left. The long-
term effect for unemployment also provides support for H3 (H =0.86).31  
<Table 3 What drives policy mood> 
This evidence confirms the thermostatic hypothesis (Wlezien 1995). The electorate responds to 
both policy and economic conditions. Changing preferences communicate a desire to reduce 
government activity when Ôtoo hotÕ and increase it when Ôtoo coldÕ.
32
 This is evidence of the first 
link in the Ôchain of responsivenessÕ and representation. It is characteristic of both electoral turnover 
and policy accommodation mechanisms (Powell 2000). We now examine the next link in the 
electoral turnover mechanism: whether votes respond to mood. 
7.  POLICY MOOD AND VOTE INTENTIONS 
Before proceeding, we must note that preferences are not the only the plausible influences on vote: 
they are also influenced by long-term partisanship (Clarke et al. 2004), policy moderation (Nagel and 
Wlezien 2011) and evaluations of competence (Green and Jennings 2010).
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 From this list of Ôusual 
suspectsÕ we only have indicators of annual party competence. These are estimated using the dyads-
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ratio-algorithm and drawing on responses to survey questions about which party is best able to deal 
with any particular issue (Green and Jennings, 2010).
34
 Unfortunately, we do not have annual 
indicators of partisanship or party position at our disposal. Partisanship was rarely measured in the 
1950s and 1960s. The ÔtraditionalÕ measure of partisanship is, moreover, influenced by the same 
short-term factors that it is assumed to shape (Clarke et al. 2004). Accordingly, our vote intention 
model tests two hypotheses: 
H4. Increasing evaluations of LabourÕs competence increase Labour vote. 
H5. Leftwards shifts in the mood increase Labour vote 
Once again we use an error correction model, as there is co-integration between the 
dependent and independent variables.
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 Table 4 assesses the relationship between annual Labour vote 
intentions, mood and evaluations of Labour competence between 1951 and 2015. The error 
correction term is significant and correctly signed (H =-0.57) suggesting that 57 per cent of any 
deviation of preferences from the target rate is corrected within one year. Both the long and short-
term coefficients for competence are significant and correctly signed (H =0.62 and H = 0.74 
respectively) providing support for H4. Crucially, the coefficient for the long-term effect of mood is 
significant (H = 0.17). As the mood moves left, Labour vote intentions increases.36 H5 is confirmed. 
<Table 4. What drives annual vote intentions> 
These results suggest that variations in mood have an electoral impact net of evaluations of 
competence. This provides some evidence for another step in the electoral turnover mechanism. The 
effect of competence is greater than mood. As a result, a move towards (say) the left in mood will 
not produce an increase in support for the Labour Party if there is even a small loss of confidence in 
the competence of the Labour Party. 
8! PARTY IDEOLOGY, MOOD AND POLICY REPRESENTATION 
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We now examine whether policy responds to party incumbency or mood. If NMGE responds to party 
incumbency, this will confirm that governments pursue policy consistent with their ideology and 
provide evidence in favour of the electoral turnover mechanism. If it responds to mood, this will 
provide evidence in favour of the policy accommodation mechanism 
We did not find an appropriate co-integrating relationship, and so did not use an error 
correction model. Instead, we took the first difference of NMGE and regressed lagged mood, the 
change in unemployment and the change in inflation on this. This is similar to the approach in 
Soroka and Wlezien (2009). This specification is theoretically appropriate because our 
operationalization of mood is intrinsically thermostatic. Respondents are typically not asked to name 
their ideal level of government spending on a programme; they are asked whether spending is too 
high, too low or about right. Left-wing mood means that the public demands more public spending 
than at present. As a result, we would expect left-wing mood to produce an increase in spending.  
If electoral turnover was producing representation, who is in government should Ômake a 
differenceÕ. Labour governments should spend more than Conservative governments other things 
being equal.
37
 Accordingly, the electoral turnover model suggests: 
H6. Labour governments have higher levels of NMGE than Conservative. 
 If policy accommodation was producing representation, NMGE should respond to the 
preferences communicated by variations in mood. The government could anticipate that the 
electorate will punish it if it does not deliver policies compatible with the mood of the electorate. 
This will lead to the government reacting to the current policy mood, perhaps with a lag. However, it 
could also anticipate what the mood the public will have at the time of the next election. If it is able 
to do this, then the future mood will have an effect on current policy. We test both possibilities. 
H7. Increases in the policy mood should increase NMGE. 
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 Table 5 displays the coefficients generated by five models. Firstly we model NMGE as 
function of mood in the previous period, the change in unemployment and the previous periodÕs 
inflation rate. In the second model we take into account policy mood in each of the previous four 
years, to explore the effect of a change in mood over a five-year parliament. We then add political 
variables to each of these models, producing models 3 and 4. We include a variable representing 
whether Labour was in government, together with a dummy variable for 1974. Public spending in 
that year increased by 4.5% of GDP as a result of factors such as the oil crisis and the minersÕ strike 
(see Figure 2). Finally, in model 5 we consider whether the governmentÕs anticipation of the mood at 
the time of the next election has an effect on policy. We add a variable for the level of mood 
forecasted in the next period using the data available to that point.
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<Table 5. What drives government spending, 1949-2013?> 
The first thing that is apparent from inspecting the five models is that mood has no significant 
effect on domestic spending Ð indeed the estimated coefficients are very close to zero. This is true 
even if we add the effects of four lags of mood. The mood forecasted for the next period also does 
not have a statistically significant effect. These results are inconsistent with H8. There is no support 
for the idea that movements in mood leads to an increase in NMGE, whether we control for the 
effect of the party in government or not. There is no support for the policy accommodation 
mechanism. 
By contrast, the coefficient for the party in government does have a significant effect. As 
importantly, this effect is substantially very significant. According to our models, Labour 
governments raise domestic spending by between 0.51 and 0.67% of GDP per year more than 
Conservative governments. Thus we find strong support for Hypothesis 8. Essentially parties keep 
pursuing the policies they are committed to, regardless of changes in public mood. 
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The effects of the various control variables are as expected. A change in unemployment leads 
to a very substantial increase in public spending. This is not unsurprising as unemployment directly 
increases spending on unemployment benefit and other social programmes. Inflation leads to
 
small, 
but significant fall in spending. Again this is what we would expect as inflation makes it easier for 
governments to cut programmes by simply not fully indexing them. The dummy variable for 1974 
also has the expected effect. 
These findings confirm the impression in Figure 5. Simply put, Ôparty mattersÕ (Blais, et al. 
1996). LabourÕs reputation as the party of ÔbigÕ or ÔbiggerÕ government party is based on fact. So is 
the Conservative partyÕs reputation as the party of ÔsmallÕ or ÔsmallerÕ government. This part of the 
Ôelectoral turnoverÕ mechanism works very well Ð the parties offer voters a consistent and reliable 
choice between ÔmoreÕ or ÔlessÕ government. We would expect that in the long-run changes in mood 
will lead to a change in government, which will in turn lead to a change in policy in line with public 
preferences. However, as we saw in the last section, mood only has a weak effect on party support, 
and this can easily be overwhelmed by considerations of competence.
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 Although we would expect 
Ôthe electoral turnoverÕ mechanism to work in the long-run, it may well fail for a considerable time if 
voters believe the opposition to be incompetent. 
9! DISCUSSION 
The proposition that the electorateÕs preferences help provide direction to policy seems implausible 
given what is known about the Ôtypical voterÕ (Achen and Bartels 2016). Yet, in Britain, as in the US, 
Òour knowledge of the individual voter turns out not to be a reliable guide for generalising to the 
electorate and its role in democratic politicsÓ (Erikson et al. 2002 p. 3). Variations in mood 
communicate real preferences and influence vote decisions.
40
 These ÔmessagesÕ, however, are not 
acted on. Representation can only work by turning over power from Ôone sideÕ to Ôthe otherÕ. The 
parties play their part by reliably pursuing policies consistent with their left-right ideology. 
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Our findings contrast with other studies that suggest that there is a degree of policy 
accommodation. Soroka and WlezienÕs 2009 study, for example, uncovered evidence of policy 
representation in specific domains such as defence, social affairs, health and education between 1978 
and 1995.
41
 Preferences in those domains responded thermostatically to spending. Policy, in turn, 
responded to preferences. Soroka and Wlezien measure preferences using responses to specific 
Gallup questions about whether spending in those domains should be increased or decreased and 
they measure policy by spending in the same domains. This approach assumes that variations in 
these individual series reflect preferences and spending in a particular domain.
42
 It seems wholly 
reasonable to suggest, however, that preferences in those domains may also partly reflect the general 
policy mood and overall spending. The observed ÔthermostaticÕ effect may well reflect the 
diminishing marginal utility of spending in that domain but it may also reflect the electorateÕs 
ambivalence to government activity Ð in particular its aversion to taxes and borrowing. This is 
particularly the case in those areas of government activity that account for a large share of 
spending.
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 It might be informative, therefore, to repeat Soroka and WlezienÕs analyses controlling 
for the policy mood (less those items relating to a specific domain) and overall spending.
44
 The 
overall budget constraint must also impose constraints on spending and responsiveness. 
Our findings also contrast with Erikson et al.Õs study of responsiveness and representation in 
the United States, which concluded that policy was sensitive to preferences. This study, like our own, 
used mood to measure preferences.
45
 Policy was measured, however, using congressional rating 
scales and roll call outcomes (Erikson et al. 2002 p 294-5).
46
 Analogous indicators are not available 
in the British case. Even if such measures were available, they would have less validity. Party 
discipline is strong and there are few defections on ideological votes (Cowley 2002). It may be that 
the US system of checks and balances ensures that preferences are taken into consideration (Powell 
2000). The same may be true of ÔconsensusÕ democracies (Lijphart, 1999). There is clearly a need for 
collaborative research along the lines of the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al. 2009). 
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Our results also differ greatly from those of Hakhverdian (2010), who argues that there is 
high degree of policy responsiveness in the British case, and furthermore that this is the result of 
Òrational anticipationÓ, a process roughly equivalent to what we refer to as Òpolicy accommodationÓ. 
However, the different results are unsurprising when we consider how Hakhverdian measures 
government policy. Like us, Hakhverdian seeks to explain how left- or right-wing government policy 
is. However, unlike us he does not measure this in terms of government actions, such as tax and 
spending decisions, but rather by the content of budget speeches, using the Wordscores programme 
(Laver et al. 2003).
47
 It seems that when public opinion moves to the left, governments include more 
left-wing themes in their budget statements, but do not change tax or spending behaviour. 
Our findings also appear to contrast with the policy agendas literature (Jennings and John 
2009, John et. al. 2013, Bevan and Jennings 2014, Bertelli and John 2013a, 2013b). This literature 
demonstrates that government attention (as measured by the content of the official policy speeches) 
is responsive to the publicÕs policy agenda (as measured by responses to the most important issue or 
most important problem question). This contrast is, however, more apparent than real, as quite 
different things are being measured. British governments appear to be responsive in the sense of 
addressing the issues that the public thinks are important. However, when it comes to decisions about 
the level of spending, they follow their party ideologies. 
10! CONCLUSIONS 
Our results suggest that domestic spending policy is not responsive to mood and is driven, 
instead, by economic conditions and party control (Str¿m 1990; Blais et al. 1996). That is to say, we 
do not find evidence of Òpolicy accommodationÓ by governments Ð governments pursue policies 
consistent with their ideologies unaffected by changes in public opinion. The unresponsiveness of 
governments seems surprising given the Ôpower hoardingÕ nature of the British constitution (King 
2007). British governments are guaranteed a parliamentary majority. The government at Westminster 
23 
!
is not constrained by federal structures. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty, moreover, 
implies that the courts do not have power of constitutional review. British governments have the 
power to either respond to or anticipate the impact of preferences Ð but they do not appear to so. 
We do find evidence that public opinion may affect policy through the mechanism of 
Òelectoral turnoverÓ. We find that changes in policy mood affect voting intentions. If policy mood 
moves against the ideology of the current government, it will lose support and eventually be replaced 
by a government whose ideology reflects the publicÕs mood. This should lead to a correction in 
policy in line with public opinion. However, this process may take a considerable amount of time. 
We find that the effect of policy mood on voting intentions is not as strong as the effect of peopleÕs 
assessment of government competence. If the public lacks faith in the competence of the opposition, 
the government may retain power for a considerable amount of time, even though it may be moving 
policy in the opposite direction the public wants. 
One reason for our findings may be that the ÔmandateÕ from the previous general election has 
greater moral force than the requirement to adjust policies to current opinion. If a strategy of policy 
accommodation were followed, moreover, it would erode a partyÕs reputation for reliability and 
responsibility (Downs 1957). Governments may follow their ideological impulses to maintain 
appeals to members, donors or core voters (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Trimming policy to reflect the 
ÔfeedbackÕ from public preferences may create intra-party tensions (Budge et al. 2010). Conservative 
governments that increase taxes, for example, will outrage business interests and the middle class. 
Labour governments that cut spending will antagonise trade unions and public sector workers. Policy 
may be responsive to majority opinion within governing parties (Hussey and Zaller 2011). 
Even if governing parties were willing Ð in principle Ð to respond to mood, they may not be 
able to detect it. Evidence about public preferences largely comes from snapshots of opinion. Viewed 
in cross-section, however, preferences are characterised by considerable ambivalence. People often 
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appear to take Ôdifferent sidesÕ on the same issue and different ÔsidesÕ on Ôseemingly-relatedÕ issues 
(Stimson 2004). The typical snapshots of preferences on diverse issues may communicate no clear 
signal. Indeed, the sheer amount of data may produce considerable uncertainty about Ôwhat the 
public want Ô(Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Druckman and Jacobs 2006). The mood is only uncovered 
once issues are standardised in terms of left and right and then aggregated (Converse 1990). It is 
understandable that governments fall back on ideology (Budge 1994). 
Given this uncertainty about what people want, it seems only reasonable to suggest that 
politicians will select evidence or interpret trends in ways that are politically congenial. Ideology 
provides the emotional basis for the sort of Ômotivated reasoningÕ (Epley and Giolvich 2016). 
Comments such as ÔitÕs not what we are hearing on the doorstepÕ may reflect either unconscious 
biases or wilful ignorance but both result in a failure to ÔreceiveÕ discomforting feedback (Kingdon 
1967). Finally, even if governments can ÔhearÕ the change of mood and even if they are prepared to 
act on it, they may believe that other factors Ð such as the Ôcosts of rulingÕ will lead to their 
inevitable defeat (Naanstead and Paldam 2007). If governments believe that the swings of the 
pendulum operate independently of policy they may well fall back on their ideology (Budge 1994). 
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Table 1. Items topics for policy mood, 1945-2015 
 
 
Topic or domain       Number per cent 
 
 
Economics 
Government intervention versus free-market
* 
   246  4.6 
Trade unions and industrial relations
*
    507  9.5 
Welfare state and social benefits
*
     282  5.3 
Public vs private ownership
*
      215  4.0 
Public services spending
*
      231  4.3 
Tax and spending
*
       159  3.0 
Poverty, inequality and redistribution
*
    314  5.9 
Inflation and unemployment
*
      133  2.5 
 
Total economics       2087  39.3 
 
Social 
Crime and law and order      317  6.0 
Moral and social attitudes      469  8.8 
Individual rights       21  0.4 
Family         122  2.3 
Post-materialist values      39  0.7 
Abortion         134  2.5 
 
Total social        1102  20.7 
 
Other 
Race relations and immigration     213  4.0 
Environment        305  5.7 
International affairs       178  3.3 
Defence spending       51  1.0 
Nuclear weapons       81  1.5 
Northern Ireland       53  1.0 
Europe         878  16.5 
British nationalism       53  1.0 
Government          13  0.2 
Monarchy         107  2.0 
Constitutional reform        78  1.5 
Religion         17  0.3 
Left-right self-placement      101  1.9 
 
Total other         2128  40.0 
 
Total         5317  100 
 
 
* 
Indicates used to estimate the policy mood   
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Table 2. Item loadings of policy mood, 1945-2015 
 
 
Abbreviated question      House  N Loading 
 
 
Trade unions are a good thing     Gallup  40 0.96 
Welfare makes people less able to stand on feet  BSA  25 0.94 
Increase taxes and spending     Gallup  19 0.92 
Trade unions too powerful      Gallup  24 0.91 
People on benefits donÕt deserve them    BSA  25 0.90 
Spend more on welfare      BSA  25 0.88 
Class struggle        BSA  14 0.87 
Trade unions too powerful      Mori  18 0.83 
Benefits are too high or low     BSA  30 0.83 
Increase tax and spending     BSA  31 0.82 
Unemployed could find a job if wanted   BSA  25 0.81 
Cutting benefits damages lives    BSA  15 0.81 
Gap between incomes too large     BSA  26 0.74 
Government should redistribute income    BSA  29 0.73 
Government spend more on pensions    Gallup  20 0.72 
Trade unions extreme      MORI  15 0.71 
People fiddle on dole      BSA  25 0.68 
Trade unions are essential     MORI  18 0.68 
Welfare state proud achievement    BSA  16 0.67 
Compulsory trade union membership    Gallup  11 0.66 
Social class affects opportunities    BSA  10 0.65 
One law for the rich and one law for poor   BSA  28 0.65 
Business too powerful     BSA  11 0.57 
Welfare state stops self-help     BSA  14 0.55 
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Figure 1. The Policy Mood, 1945-2015
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Figure 2. Non--military government spending, 1948-2013
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Figure 3. Changes in non-military government expenditure by government, 1951-2013
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Figure 4. Average rates of direct tax, 1949-2013
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Table 3. What drives the policy mood?  
(Error correction model, 1948-2013) 
 
 
Error correction  -0.81
***  
t = 6.75 
   (0.12)   McKinnon p<0.01 critical t value: 4.23 
 
Unemploymentt-1   
Long-term   0.86
*** 
 
   (0.21) 
Short-term   0.59 
   (0.10) 
 
Average direct tax t-1 
Long-term   -0.37
**
 
   (0.15) 
Short-term   -0.11 
   (0.35) 
 
Domestic spending t-1
 
Long-term   -0.45
*** 
   
(0.16) 
Short-term   -0.59
***
 
   (0.29) 
 
 
N    63 
Breusch-Godfrey  0.03 
Adjusted R
2 
  0.44 
Root MSE   2.66 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller value for integrating equation: -4.30 (lag order 3) 
***
 
 
 
***
=p<0.01, 
** 
=p<0.05 
* 
=p<0
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Table 4. What drives annual vote intentions? 
(Error correction model of Labour vote intentions, 1951-2015) 
 
 
Error correction  -0.57
***  
t = 4.75 
    (0.12)   McKinnon p<0.01 critical t value: 3.29 
 
Mood t-1 
 
Long-term   0.17
** 
  
   (0.08) 
Short-term   0.06 
   (0.10) 
 
Macro-competence t-1 
 
Long-term   0.62
***
 
   (0.17) 
Short-term   0.74
***
 
   (0.11) 
 
Constant   -7.60
* 
   
(4.40) 
 
 
N    64 
Breusch Godfrey  2.34 
Adjusted R
2
   0.52 
Root MSE   2.24 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller value for integrating equation: -4.27 (lag order 3)
***
 
 
 
***
=p<0.01, 
** 
=p<0.05 
* 
=p<0.1
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Table 5. What drives annual policy? 
(Modelling domestic government expenditure, 1949-2013) 
 
 
      
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
      
Mood t-1 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.41 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.73) 
Mood t-2  -0.05  0.00 -0.17 
  (0.06)  (0.05) (0.33) 
Mood t-3  0.05  0.01 -0.07 
  (0.06)  (0.05) (0.17) 
Mood t-4  0.05  0.04 -0.01 
  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.10) 
Forecasted mood     0.68 
     (1.32) 
Sum of lags and   -0.01  0.02 0.02 
forecast (mood)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
      
∆Unemployment 0.74
***
 0.69
***
 0.80
***
 0.78
***
 0.76
***
 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
      
Inflationt-1 -0.08
*
 -0.08
*
 -0.09
**
 -0.09
**
 -0.08
**
 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Labour in govt.   0.67
**
 0.60
*
 0.51 
   (0.32) 0.34 (0.38) 
1974 dummy   4.64
***
 4.65
***
 4.70
***
 
   (1.18) (1.21) (1.23) 
      
Constant 2.40 1.31 0.37 -0.60 -1.01 
 (2.33) (2.54) (2.15) (2.34) (2.48) 
      
N 64 64 64 64 64 
Adj. R
2 
0.12 0.12 0.34 0.33 0.32 
MSE 1.33 1.33 1.15 1.16 1.17 
      
 
***
=p<0.01, 
** 
=p<0.05 
* 
=p<0.1 
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 For example, there are ÒminimalistÓ theories of democracy, which argue that the value of 
democracy is simply the discipline imposed on governments by the fact they can be replaced (Weber 
1921 / 1978; Schumpeter 1942; Riker 1982). Pzweworski (1999) goes as far as to argue that even the 
random replacement of governments could bring many of the benefits of democracy. Other theories 
of democracy are strictly procedural, arguing that democracy should be defined in terms of the 
fariness of the institutions, rather than its policy outcomes. The Òpopulist theory of democracyÓ in 
DahlÕs Preface to Democratic Theory is of this kind (Dahl 1956, ch.2). 
3
 If representatives act as delegates for separate constituencies, we may not observe responsiveness 
to public opinion as a whole. For example, delegates who are strictly bound by the instructions of 
their constituents may lack the discretion necessary to reach the compromises needed to pass any 
legislation at all. 
4
 Of course, the public does not in general issue explicit instructions. Rather, we need to infer the 
intentions of the public from election results. For example, parties may offer electoral programmes 
and pledges, and the public may endorse them by electing the party (what Mansbridge 2003 refers to 
as Òpromissory representationÓ.) Alternatively, governments could observe public opinion and react 
to what the public wants, anticipating that the electorate will punish it at the next election if it does 
not (Òanticipatory representationÓ in MansbridgeÕs terminology). 
5
 Petitt (2010) rejects the idea that public opinion exists exogenously and controls policy, and argues 
that a trustee conception of representation is inevitable. However, he argues that public opinion and 
policy correspond to one another in a democracy because both are determined by the same process of 
deliberation and public reason. Indeed Petitt (2010, 82) argues that the Westminster system is 
responsive to public opinion precisely because the representatives behave as trustees 
6
 We might also consider the standard proposed by Fishkin (1995), who argued that representatives 
should adopt the policies the public would choose if they were properly informed. 
7
 In 2015 government spending as percentage of GDP in OECD countries varied from 29% in Ireland 
to 57% in Finland (OECD 2017). 
8
 Bevan and Jennings (2014) find that while government attention (measured by either mentions in 
the Queens speech or legislation) does respond to the publicÕ s assessment of problems, government 
spending does not in a statistically significant way. Jennings and Wlezien (2015) show that the 
public perception of a problem being important does not in general correlate with a public demand 
for more money to be spent on the issue. 
9
 See Hakhverdian (2011) for such an attempt. 
10
 Questions that refer to Ôthe governmentÕ are a special case. Where the question refers to 
government in the abstract it is retained. Where it refers to the incumbents, it is not included. 
11
 We cannot be claim that we found all the data. We can claim that we used all the data that we 
could find. The series vary greatly in length. The longest Gallup series on whether Ôtrades unions are 
a good thingÕ spans some 45 years and is entered in the database some 58 times. Many others span 
just two years. The longest series relate to the core issues.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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12
 It is not difficult to code responses items as left and right. The exceptions relate to technological 
issues such as those relating to genetics on which the parties have not taken positions. 
13
 The mood can also be estimated by McGannÕs (2014) estimated based on item-response theory. 
The two methods produce very similar results. 
14
 The algorithm estimates dyads both forwards and backwards and averages the two. 
15
 The policy mood series can be smoothed using an exponential operator. All the models here use 
unsmoothed mood. 
16
 The series bounces up in the late 1940s Ð probably a result of the thinness of the data. This has no 
consequences for our analyses. The mood models are estimated from 1948; the vote intentions 
models from 1951. Bi-annual estimates of the mood produce essentially identical results. 
17
 The additional items that would meet joint requirements would include items relating to the 
European Union, left-right self-placement, environmentalism and post-materialism. 
18
 See the Glossary in the Public Finances Data Bank: 
http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/docs/dlm_uploads/PSF_aggregates_databank_September_2016.xls 
19
 Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
20
 The NMGE series starts in 1951 because the SIPRI database starts then. This is also convenient 
since it misses out the major period of demilitarisation 1945-50. 
21
 The Heath government started off by cutting spending but was forced to increase as a result of 
domestic opposition and the oil-price shocks. Since there was a change of government following the 
February 1974 election, the end point for the Heath government and the start date for the Wilson 
government is 1973. 
22
 In principle, we could incorporate ONS indicator of public sector current receipts (PSCR). This 
indicator is highly correlated, however, with TME. 
23
 Direct taxes include income tax and national insurance. Estimates to 2005 were produced by 
Frances Lynch at the University of Westminster (Johnson et al., 2005). This has been updated to 
2013 by the authors using the same data sources. 
24
 This is despite the fact that income tax generates only £182 billion of the £721 billion (25 per cent) 
of total revenue in 2016/17. See H. M. Treasury, Budget 2016. 
25
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics (lag order 3) for the three dependent variables were as 
follows: Policy mood -2.02 (p=0.57); Vote intentions -2.43 (p=0.40); Domestic spending -1.93 
(p=0.60). In all cases the null hypothesis of a non-stationary unit root process cannot be rejected. 
26
 Formally this requires that when the variables are regressed, the error term is stationary. 
27
 For example, Keele, Lim and Webb (2016) follow Deboef and Keele (2008) in arguing that error 
correction models can be applied to stationary data, while Esarey (2016) argues that they can 
usefully be applied to data generated by a partially differenced process. 
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28
 A further objection that could be made to our use of error correction models based on the work of 
Grant and Lebo (2016) is that our data is not really unit-root given that our variables are bounded. 
They argue that fractionally differenced models are more appropriate in these cases. However, none 
of our variables come close to reaching their theoretical bounds. Esarey (2016) shows that the 
amount of data required to reliably estimate a fractionally differenced process is far larger than the 
64 years of data we have, and also shows that an error correction model can provide a useful 
approximation to a fractionally differenced process when co-integration is present. 
29
Similarly, inflation may lead the electorate to prefer less activity. Inflation is not statistically 
significant in the mood models and is omitted. This is the result of its high correlation with NMGE 
(PearsonÕs R=0.60, between 1948 and 2014). 
30
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller score (lag level 3) for the equation in levels is -4.30. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in the error term is rejected at the 1% level, indicating that co-
integration is present. The value of the error correction term is -0.81 with a standard error of 0.12 and 
thus a t-value of 6.75. The 1% critical t-value for using this parameter as co-integration test with 64 
observations and three variables is 4.23 (calculated from Ericsson and MacKinnon 2002). Thus we 
conclude co-integration is present. 
31
 The effects for unemployment and spending reported here are generally stronger than those 
reported in Bartle et al. (2011a). This is probably because this estimate of mood is only based on the 
core economic items and because government spending is measured by NMGE rather than TME. 
32
 This is consistent with StimsonÕs (1999) core finding that cycles occur between policy mood and 
government activity. 
33
 Policy moderation is defined in terms of the distance between the major party and the Liberal 
Democrats (or predecessors) in Nagel and Wlezien (2011). 
34
 Assessments of party competence are estimated using Gallup, Ipsos-Mori and YouGov data 
gathered by the authors, separately from Green and Jennings (2011). 
35
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller score (lag level 3) for the equation in levels is -4.27. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in the error term is rejected at the 1% level, indicating that co-
integration is present. The value of the error correction term is -0.57 with a standard error of 0.12 and 
thus a t-value of 4.75. The 1% critical t-value for using this parameter as co-integration test with 64 
observations and three variables is 3.29 (calculated from Ericsson and MacKinnon 2002). Thus we 
conclude co-integration is present. 
36
 Mood does not appear to influence Conservative or Liberal Democrat vote intentions. It should be 
noted that mood is significant in Labour vote models for general elections (N=16) where controls are 
imposed for LabourÕs position (as represented by the RILE scores), a count variable (capturing 
unmeasured variables) and evaluations of competence.  
37
 Between 1945 and 2010 there were a total of eight turnovers of power (1945, 1951, 1964, 1970, 
February 1974, 1979, 1997 and 2010). The turnovers in 1951 and 1964 occurred late in the year, so 
in those years Labour are treated as the incumbents in 1951 and the Conservatives are treated as the 
incumbents in 1964. The turnover in February 1974 took place in February 1974 took place in early 
March, so Labour is treated as the incumbent government. In all other cases (1945, 1970, 1979, 1997 
and 2010), the turnover took place in the middle of the year and these are coded as 0. 
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38
 We estimated a univariate ARIMA model for our policy mood measure. The best fitting model 
involved differencing the mood once and had a first-order moving average term (ARIMA (0,1,1). 
The moving average term was -0.46 with a standard error of 0.11, and the sigma for the overall 
model was 3.51. This model was then used to create a forecast for each period based on the data 
from previous periods. 
39
 The impact of mood may be different if we had a reliable annual measure of party position. 
40
 Biases in the electoral system may reduce policy responsiveness (Johnston et al., 2012). 
41
 Their study also covered representation in the US and Canada. 
42
 Soroka and Wlezien used lagged dependent variables. The results are laid out in Soroka and 
Wlezien (2009, p. 96 table 5.2). 
43
 Soroka and Wlezien recognise that thermostatic responses and policy accommodation are more 
likely in the most ÔimportantÕ domains (2009, p. 170). Importance is presumably correlated with total 
spending. They were unable to examine the welfare domain because reliable time series data on 
welfare spending was not available (Soroka et al., 2006). Welfare accounted for around 35 per cent 
of total government spending in 2015. 
44
 Just as in our analyses, Soroka and Wlezien measure policy by budgets. Spending, however, is 
measured in real terms rather than as a percentage of GDP. This difference does not account for our 
findings. Replacing NMGE as a proportion of GDP with TME in real terms makes no difference. 
There is no evidence of policy accommodation. 
45
 They imposed fewer assumptions than we do here and included many items relating to Ôsocial 
issuesÕ. This is unlikely to make any difference for reasons outline above. 
46
 Erikson et al. (2002) produce indicators for both the House of Representatives and President. This 
makes little sense in Britain, given the effective ÔfusionÕ of the legislature and executive. 
47
 The Wordscores programme essentially compares word frequencies in reference and virgin texts. 
The application of these methods to long time series is a cause of concern since the vocabulary of 
politics is likely to change over seventy years. The choice of reference texts is of crucial importance. 
Hedging by using a large number of references texts tends to Ôflatten outÕ variations (Budge and 
Pennings 2007). There are other issues: Òestimated document scores are on the wrong scale and the 
theoretical development does not specify a statistical model, so it is unclear what assumptions the 
method makes about political text and how to tell whether they fit particular text analysis 
applicationsÓ (Lowe 2008, p. 356). 
